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Federalist 30
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution.
We do not seem to recognize the corollary today that excess money, like excess food, leads to gluttany and an unhealthy government.
Federalist 31
I love the direct logic in the opening here. The assumptions are laid out and unless you can dispute the assumptions it is difficult to dispute the conclusion.
IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings [sic] must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind. . . Of this nature are the maxims in geometry, that "the whole is greater than its part; things equal to the same are equal to one another; two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right angles are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the end; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object; that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation. (emphasis added)
I also think it is interesting to note that the idea of the federal government seeking handouts from the states seemed repugnant, but today we see the repugnance of states which are almost entirely financially dependent on the federal government as was warned by the opposing argument that "an indefinite power of taxation in the {federal government} might, and probably would in time, deprive the {state governments} of the means of providing for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to the mercy of the national legislature."
Federalist 32
It is interesting to see that even where he is wrong (believing that this danger was not real), Hamilton illustrates the very dangers that we face today as the states have almost entirely melted into the background in the face of the federal government.
Federalist 33
I found this to be an insightful and succinct delineation of the difference between laws and treaties:
If a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact . . . must necessarily be supreme over those societies . . . It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and not a goverment.
Unfortunately today most of our laws are apparently nothing more than treaties that are being ignored – including the Constitution as a whole (only the form – three branches including a bicameral legislature – remains).
Federalist 34
When Hamilton explains that 93% of the expenses of the British government are dedicated to paying for war, war preparation, and war debts it should open our eyes to the foolishness of our perpetual expansion of our domestic expenses as if we could add increased military expenses when the need arises.
Federalist 35
I was interested in the recognition that representatives would not be elected from different professions in proportion to how those professions were represented in society. There is an inherent degree of inequality dues to the differing demands of different professions. Hamilton argues that those who understand money and financial realities are the best able to produce good government.
Federalist 36
Hamilton makes a passing remark that makes me think twice about the merits of expanding Congress as suggested by Thirty-Thousand.org – a larger body eventually reaches a size where they are unlikely to have any wisdom beyond the general populous – the only real question is what size is that?
12 replies on “Federalist Nos. 30 – 36”
J.E.,
I am a big supporter of the ideas espoused at Thirty-Thousand.org and I agree that our current House of Representatives is displaying an utter lack of wisdom – probably due to their huge congressional districts in which they are not able to really engage their constituents.
The changes wrought by the 17th Amendment really changed the nature of our Senate and virtually eliminated the benefits of the bicameral nature of Congress. I’ve had this discussion before and feel that a repeal of the 17th would be beneficial especially if we could address the issues that caused its enactment.
I think that the only difference between my position and yours is that my level of confidence in the wisdom that would be displayed by a body of 6000. It may be a good thing, but it is not something we should do without having the debate about the proper size. The goals of Thirty-Thousand.org would not limit the House to 6000 so while I think the goal is laudable I think we need to decide what the right size of a district is so that the Representatives are actually engaged and responsive to their district constituents (rather than being “mega-politicians”) while holding off the time when the House grows to the point of impeded wisdom dues to sheer size (as much as possible). That might be 30,000 or 50,000 or possibly as much as 250,000. We are completely on the same page that our current body of 435 have neither their own wisdom nor the ability to tap into any wisdom from among their 700,000 constituents (each) necessary to produce the good policies that we need.
You reference Hamilton’s concern that “a larger body eventually reaches a size where they are unlikely to have any wisdom beyond the general populous”. To the extent that may be a reasonable concern, you are correct to ask “what size is that?”. That is a debate we should all have.
However, given the federal Representatives’ apparent lack of wisdom, in these times, I wish that they could rise to the level of wisdom exhibited by the general populous. Would not that be a huge improvement upon their current level of folly? Personally, I have more faith in the general wisdom of the populous than I do the assembled collection of clowns now masquerading as representatives. And, as an example, we can look to the millions of people who vote wisely in California’s proposition system; they act, in effect, as a virtual assembly of millions.
In any case, those who shared Hamilton’s elitist concern were satisfied in the wisdom that would be produced by a qualified Senate. And, by “qualified Senate”, I mean prior to the 17th amendment, when the states’ legislatures could appoint the Senators.
I have every confidence that a representative body comprised of 6,000 citizen Representatives (rather than 435 mega-politicians) could act quite wisely, in their aggregate. Those who wish to further bolster the wisdom of the Congress would do well to focus their efforts on the repeal of the 17th amendment.
Thirty-Thousand.org is a non-partisan and non-profit 501(c)(3) organization.
“…there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation .”
“an indefinite power of taxation in the {federal government} might, and probably would in time, deprive the {state governments} of the means of providing for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to the mercy of the national legislature.”
Both are eye-popping statements to which we should pay especial heed.
On Federalist 35, few of the members of our national legislature have the remotest clue of monetary principles and financial realities. We do not elect money- and finance-wise people to office, nor do many of them have much desire to hold office. It’s not what turns their crank.
I appreciated Quidam’s commentary and David’s response. I think understand what Hamilton is getting at.
In IT development I have found that effective development teams have a optimal size (depending of the project being tackled). Once you reach the that optimum, the addition of each resource adds diminishing value due to the increased need for coordination, until you reach a point where adding resources actually reduces effectiveness. Eventually the size can get so great as to stymie progress altogether.
When a project is running behind schedule, one of management’s favorite things to do is to apply more resources. However, if the ideal team size has already been achieved or exceeded, they can end up causing the deadline to slip even further.
Deliberative bodies can work like that, but I think there are enough differenced between such bodies and IT development teams that the problem Hamilton foresees would not be as bad as he assumed it would be. For one thing, technology has helped mitigate some of the problem. For another thing, a greatly expanded House would elect its own agenda setting leadership, much as it does now, to help maintain order. And, as Quidam said, a broad body that more closely approximates its constituents could reasonably be expected to produce superior results to our current limited-sized House.
Due to evolving technology, I’m not sure that it would be possible or wise to set a lasting size limitation on the House, no matter how big it might become. Necessity is the mother of invention, so an expanding House might even spur new technologies to enhance collaboration.
I really should not have much of a hangup on increasing the size of the House. Representatives of reasonable sized districts (meaning much less than the current 700,000) will almost certainly be a vast improvement – more than enough to make up for any potential inefficiency that might arise from the larger size. Also, as Reach points out, we have technology and a drive to conquer obstacles which will help mitigate any negative side effects of a larger House – after all, the current House is anything but good government.
It is good to debate what size the House should be, and it’s a debate that started long ago. As one of his original set of amendments to the Bill of Rights, James Madison had proposed changing the *maximum* population size of congressional districts to 30,000 (rather than that being the minimum). In defending his proposal, he stated the following on August 14, 1789: “I do not consider it necessary, on this occasion, to go into a lengthy discussion of the advantages of a less or greater representation. I agree that after going beyond a certain point, the number may become inconvenient; … but it is necessary to go to a certain number, in order to secure the great objects of representation. Numerous bodies are undoubtedly liable to some objections, but they have their advantages also; if they are more exposed to passion and fermentation, they are less subject to venality and corruption; and in a Government like this, where the House of Representatives is connected with a smaller body [the Senate], it might be good policy to guard them in a particular manner against such abuse.”
Note he says that a large House “*may* become inconvenient”. That’s the sort of inconvenience that I believe would be good for the country because, as he also points out: “Numerous bodies…are less subject to venality and corruption”
Regarding technology, it’s interesting to consider that the Constitution was written long before new fangled technology — like the train or telegraph — were even conceived. Perhaps the biggest benefit of virtual assemblies would be keeping the Representatives closer to home, where we can keep an eye on them.
The more I think about it the more clear it becomes that the current House, limited to 435 seats with districts approaching a million people, is more like the Senate Jr. than it is a different sort of legislative body (as it was intended to be).
That is correct. We were supposed to have a Senate and a “peoples’ House”, instead we have one oligarchy comprised of two Senates.
Two interesting links:
“Political Monopoly Power”
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/oct/19/political-monopoly-power/
This is Walter Williams’ article, in which he observes that “restricting the number of representatives confers significant monopoly power that goes a long way toward explaining the stranglehold the two parties have and the high incumbent success rates. It might also explain the power of vested interest groups to influence congressional decisions.”
Listen to the 10-minute interview of Dr. Mark Thornton:
http://www.lewrockwell.com/podcast/?p=episode&name=2008-11-16_069_the_case_for_bigger_government.mp3
Dr. Thornton has written two papers providing empirical evidence that total governmental expenditures *decrease* as the number of representatives increases.
I’m very interested in the work of Dr. Thornton> – I’d love to see those papers and understand how an increased number of representatives produces decreased spending. Thanks for sharing those links.
I always believed that an increased number of Reps would reduce spending due to “common sense” arguments (which of course are debatable). To oversimplify, there will be a tremendous increase in accountability (of the Representative to his/her constituency) when the districts become much smaller — at which time they’ll serve the citizens instead of the powerful special interests to whom they are now beholden.
One of the forgotten heroes of the NY Convention, Melancton Smith, put it this way: “It appears to me that, had economy been a motive for making the representation small, it might have operated more properly in leaving out some of the offices which this Constitution requires. I am sensible that a great many of the common people, who do not reflect, imagine that a numerous representation involves a great expense; but they are not aware of the real security it gives to an economical management in all the departments of government.” ***and***
“The difference of expense, between supporting a House of Representatives sufficiently numerous, and the present proposed one, would be twenty or thirty thousand dollars per annum. The man who would seriously object to this expense, to secure his liberties, does not deserve to enjoy them. Besides, by increasing the number of representatives, we open a door for the admission of the substantial yeomanry of our country, who, being possessed of the habits of economy, will be cautious of imprudent expenditures, by which means a greater saving will be made of public money than is sufficient to support them.”
Disregarding the devaluation of the dollar since 1788, it is his last sentence, about the yeomanry’s being “cautious of imprudent expenditures” that I would really like everyone to ponder.
Here are more great quotes from Melancton Smith:
http://www.thirty-thousand.org/pages/NY_debates1.htm
Of course, we also need empirical evidence to bolster such an argument, and Dr. Thornton was astute enough to develop those arguments. His two reports can be accessed from this page:
http://www.thirty-thousand.org/pages/resources.htm
(They are currently the 2nd and 6th articles listed.)
Thanks again for those links.
Though this is truly a non-partisan issue, it’s worth noting that those who most oppose a larger government, the Libertarians, tend to be most supportive of enlarging our representation.
One of the challenges of this cause is that some of the arguments seem counter-intuitive. (This has forced me to become a more patient person.)
It makes sense that the Libertarians would be interested in having representatives that were more responsive to their constituents.