Tag: State Constitution

Federalist Nos. 69 – 70

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In Federalist No. 69 Hamilton argues that the president is not as powerful a position as some have made it out to be while in Federalist No. 70 he argues that having any less power vested in the president would be a recipie for bad government.

I have found it to be very interesting, not only in these Federalist Papers, to see the proposed government compared to the state governments that existed as well as to foreign governments. For example, Hamilton shows how the office of president as proposed holds powers inferior not only to the king of Great Britain (to which it had been compared by detractors) but also in virtually every instance to many of the governors of individual states. The other thing that I find interesting in this study is how closely subsequent state governments model the federal Constitution when they were being established.

Tags Constitution, documents, federalist, history, State Constitution

National

Federalist Nos. 47 – 48

I had never really considered the interplay between the concept of separation of powers and the concept of checks and balances between branches of government. Here Madison explores the limits on the separation of powers (Federalist No. 47) and the necessity of robust checks and balances (Federalist No. 48). Having read these papers I have a greater respect for the delicate balance that the founders were attempting to strike.

Madison also provides some input into the perspective of the people of his time as he discusses their propensity to fear the power of the Executive branch over the power of the Legislative branch. He argues that the unchecked legislature was as dangerous (and more likely in the government of the United States) as an absolute monarch:

In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in person the legislative functions, and are continually exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magistrates, tyranny may well be apprehended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter. But in a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited; both in the extent and the duration of its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.

Given our current experience it might be very easy for us to think that he was wrong and that the people were right to have more fear of their executive branch than of their legislative branch. We would do well to remember that the recent and pervasive abuses of the executive branch, and the expansion of power within that branch were facilitated by a Congress that was complicit at worst and neglectful of their own duties at best. While it is certainly time to curtail the authority of the executive branch we should be mindful that these abuses were less a failing of the Constitution than they were a failure on the part of our other elected representatives. In fact, Madison discuses a similar situation in the government of Pennsylvania:

It appears, also, that the executive department had not been innocent of frequent breaches of the constitution. There are three observations, however, which ought to be made on this head: FIRST, a great proportion of the instances were either immediately produced by the necessities of the war, or recommended by Congress or the commander-in-chief; SECONDLY, in most of the other instances, they conformed either to the declared or the known sentiments of the legislative department; THIRDLY, the executive department of Pennsylvania is distinguished from that of the other States by the number of members composing it. In this respect, it has as much affinity to a legislative assembly as to an executive council. And being at once exempt from the restraint of an individual responsibility for the acts of the body, and deriving confidence from mutual example and joint influence, unauthorized measures would, of course, be more freely hazarded, than where the executive department is administered by a single hand

The executive branch of Pennsylvania at that time was composed of a thirteen-member Supreme Executive Council.

It’s time for our Congress to stand up and do their job of checking the executive branch. Once they do that they should follow it up by mandating that the president reduce the footprint of the federal government by shrinking or eliminating government agencies or departments that are not essential to providing the services that are appropriate to the federal government.

Tags checks and balances, documents, federalist, history, Pennsylvania, separation of powers, State Constitution

State

Rejecting Amendment E

While amendment D looks to close a loophole in the Constitution, Constitutional Amendment E appears to be opening a loophole. I admit that there is potential to increase the funds available for public education if we allow some of those funds to be invested in private company stocks or bonds. The problem is that this amendment provides no guidelines or safeguards to such a practice and therefore the only guarantee that we have from this amendment is that we increase the risk attached to the funds available for public education.

If the legislature wants to take public money and make use of stocks and bonds to increase the value of our tax revenues I could be pursuaded to accept that, but they had better put some safeguards on the ways our public funds are invested in the Constitution, rather than relying on future statutes to define any protective measures – the original prohibition serves to safeguard public money, when making such a large exception we should be sure that there are some limitations in place.

Tags 2008, amendments, ballot initiatives, elections, State Constitution, Utah

State

Supporting Amendment D

With the insertion of only 12 words Constitutional Amendment D would close a technicality which could be used by some enterprising politicians to wreak havoc on the necessary and often too-political process of redistricting. Now is a good time to do it too because, while redistricting is usually little more than adjusting existing district boundaries, our next redistricting will include the creation of a new district (barring some major surprises). Without this amendment, redistricting could be declared invalid if a special session became necessary on a different subject between the time of the census and the next general session. Also, it could be challenged in the event of the U.S. Census Bureau taking longer than expected to process the census results.

This amendment helps to protect the state from adding any more political maneuvering in this important and often partisan process.

Tags 2008, amendments, ballot initiatives, elections, State Constitution, Utah

State

Rejecting Amendment C

My position on Constitutional Amendment C is much like my position on Amendment A – it is unnecessary tinkering with the constitution. I don’t see any advantage to starting the session a week later than we do currently.

I don’t buy his argument that citizens would "more appropriately honor the late Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., President George Washington, and President Abraham Lincoln" if the legislature were not in session on those two holidays.

I also expect that budget negotiations function just like any other project – they will fill every bit of time available no matter how much time we allow. Giving them an extra 8 days after the final tax revenue amounts are available will only mean that the Legislators will feel rushed in considering the budget adjustments for 22 days instead of feeling rushed about the final numbers for 14 days.

Finally, if the session were set for the first week of January I might see an advantage to moving the session back a week, but starting the third week does not seem any worse than starting the fourth week. I understand the arguments given by Sen. Valentine in favor of the time change but, like the budget adjustments, the draft legislation, budget analysis, and other technical work will fill whatever time is allotted. If our legislature needs more time they could try not considering 5 minor Constitutional amendments in a single session. (How much time was spent crafting, holding hearings, debating, and voting on those?)

Tags 2008, amendments, ballot initiatives, elections, State Constitution, Utah

State

Supporting Amendment B

I was pleased to find that Constitutional Amendment B was absolutely as straightforward in its proposed wording as the description suggested. It simply inserts one line into the Constitution allowing for more flexibility in adding funds to the existing state trust fund without making it easier for the Legislature to remove money from the fund. Believing that the fund is a positive tool funding our government services I am happy to support a no-nonsense change that can make it easier to augment the trust fund when resources are avaiable to do so.

At first I worried that making it easier to add to the trust fund would encourage the Legislature to keep surpluses of revenue, but then I realized that 1) they already do keep portions of any surplus fund one-time contributions to pet projects, and 2) they still have the same incentive to give tax-refunds when possible to fuel their re-election popularity. The difference now is that they have the option when there are surplusses to put some of the surplus in the trust fund so that it can increase funding for services in perpetuity rather than being limited to large, one-time gifts to specific projects.

Tags 2008, amendments, ballot initiatives, State Constitution, Utah

meta State

Rejecting Amendment A

Let me start off by saying that Constitutional Amendment A does not have anything sinister or devious in it. In fact, there is very little in it to raise objections about. My primary objection is rooted in my position on constitutionally based governments in which I prefer to reject any amendment to the established law unless I see good reason for the change – in other words, I default to opposition where constitutional amendments are concerned.

This amendment would clarify the specifics of succession in the office of Governor and Lieutenant Governor. The specifics themselves are fairly mundane, but the situation being addressed is one that hopefully and probably will never occur. (Davis Didjeridu reminds me that a vacancy can happen for less than tragic reasons – such as federal appointment – making this situation more common than I had been thinking.) In the event that one of those vacancies did occur, common sense should allow the succession to happen seamlessly even without these specified specifics being added to the State Constitution.

There is one place where I have a specific objection to the amendment. In the section dealing with the succession of the Lieutenant Governor, it specifies that the Governor must receive the consent of the Senate for the person they would appoint to fill the vacancy. This appears to violate the separation of powers considering that the Governor, when running for office, needs no consent from the Senate when picking a running mate. I see no reason that selecting a replacement should have tighter safeguards than the original selection.

In summary, there is little to recommend this change, and more to discourage it. I won’t be overly concerned if it does pass, but I believe that not making such a change is the better choice.

Tags 2008, amendments, ballot initiatives, elections, State Constitution, Utah