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Federalist No. 73 demonstrates two instances where the framers of the Constitution designed not for a virtuous system, but for a system riddled with human fallibility. The static nature of executive compensation helps mitigate the human fallibility of the executive.
There are men who could neither be distressed nor won into a sacrifice of their duty; but this stern virtue is the growth of few soils; and in the main it will be found that a power over a man’s support is a power over his will.
On the other hand, the qualified veto helps to mitigate the human fallibility that would be present in the legislative branch:
The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the Executive, but upon the supposition that the legislature will not be infallible; that the love of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to encroach upon the rights of other members of the government; that a spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its deliberations; that impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which itself, on maturer reflection, would condemn.
This paper also includes what could be used as a yardstick to measure how well our government is working:
It is far less probable, that culpable views of any kind should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and in relation to the same object, than that they should by turns govern and mislead every one of them.
The measure is that the more we see the different branches of government succumbing to the same undesirable forces the worse off our government is doing. Hamilton obviously recognized this as he expressed this hope:
It is to be hoped that it will not often happen that improper views will govern so large a proportion as two thirds of both branches of the legislature at the same time; and this, too, in spite of the counterposing weight of the Executive.
6 replies on “Federalist No. 73”
Publius’ fear of (nearly) two thirds of both branches and the executive being well aligned has happened in the past and it may well happen again in the future.
During the first three decades of the 19th Century there was essentially only one viable political party representing the Jeffersonian view. Factions within that party eventually became strong enough to split.
Then when FDR came to power in 1933, Republicans were swept from power leaving Democrats with 63% of the seats in the Senate and 72.4% of the seats in the House. After the 1934 mid-term elections, those percentages jumped to 72% and 74% respectively. Is it any wonder that Roosevelt was able to pass so much socializing policy in such a short period of time? Much of this legislation still frames our everyday lives.
The Supreme Court ruled against some of FDR’s policies, so he devised a plan in his second term to pack the court with eight additional justices, all selected by him. Fortunately, a few power brokers in his own party broke ranks with him on that.
I remember learning about FDR’s attempted power grab. That was a close call in our history. I have said before and continue to believe that our best hope in government will always be to have each major party in control of at least one of the Presidency, the House, and the Senate. And rarely if ever should one party control a supermajority of either house (or even 60% of the Senate).
I agree that divided government usually is a better model of good government than is one-party rule. But how it is divided is also important. In modern times, government has grown least when the presidency has been Democratic and Congress has been Republican.
On the other hand, my libertarian friends will say that the whole thing is a sideshow to mask the steady encroachment of government and reduction of liberty.
That’s true. Under a Republican president and a Democratic Congress we got a lot of talk about how they differed ideologically, but the deficit and government grew as if they were all on the same team. Perhaps the Republican party is better suited to the tasks of the legislative branch than the Democratic party – but only if they do not have a Republican president to follow like sheep.
Or perhaps it comes down to being an opposition party. Democrats are up front about wanting to spend more and expand government, so when the president is Democratic and the Congress Republican, Congress digs in its heels in opposition, as occurred under Clinton. When the president is Republican and the Congress is Democratic, it digs in against spending limitations in opposition, as occurred under Reagan. When Republicans run the whole show, they act a lot like Democrats running the whole show.
You may be right about the opposition party explanation because it does not matter which party is in control – if one party dominates all three the result is essentially the same.