Tag: federalist

Federalist No. 67

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In Federalist No. 67 Hamilton is clearly upset at those who oppose the proposed Constitution because of their outrageous misrepresentation of the content of the Constitution in relation to the office of President. As I read the example of misrepresentation that he recounted I recognized the same spirit of selective fact presentation that is altogether too common among activists of all stripes in our nation today. In some ways we really have not changed that much in the last two centuries.

Tags discourse, documents, federalist, history

General National

Federalist No. 66

Federalist No. 66 has me seeking opinions on a few questions. Specifically it got me asking which of the four elements of our federal government (the Executive, the Judicial, the Senate, and the House) is the most powerful? Which Should be the most powerful? The founders clearly had some idea about which they thought should be the most powerful:

that the most POPULAR branch of every government, partaking of the republican genius, by being generally the favorite of the people, will be as generally a full match, if not an overmatch, for every other member of the Government. (emphasis original)

Their expectation was for the House to exert the most influence, but to be sufficiently checked to prevent it from becoming a law unto itself.

The wording of the above quote also got me thinking about two other questions. In this day of low approval ratings (not as low now as they were six months ago), which of the four is the most popular? Is that most popular one the most powerful?

I suspect that the most popular of them is the Executive branch now – last year it might well have been the Judicial branch. I am fairly confident that one of those two branches is generally the most powerful, although I’m not sure that it is always the same one of those who that holds the upper hand.

Tags checks and balances, documents, federalist, government, history

General National

Federalist Nos. 64 – 65

In discussing the powers of the senate related to the making of treaties John Jay outlines a truth that undercuts one of the major arguments against term limits. In Federalist No. 64 he states:

providing for the frequent elections of senators in such a way as to obviate the inconvenience of periodically transferring those great affairs entirely to new men; for by leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in place, uniformity and order, as well as a constant succession of official information will be preserved.

The argument that term limits would place institutional knowledge quarely in the hands of lobbyists is a strong one until we consider that the very form of senate elections was to preserve institutional knowledge across elections. Even if we were to go to the extreme of enforcing a single term limit on every elected member of the federal government each state would always have at least one member of their congressional delegation that had at least two years worth of experience in Washington. Overall, each new election would leave at least 66 out of 536 elected officials returning to Washington to pass on their institutional experience. Considering how poorly 90 – 95% transfer of institutional experience has served this country recently I don’t see that we could be much worse off by having a 13% transfer of institutional experience.

I cannot imagine suggesting such an extreme term limit policy, and I don’t pretend that this answers all the critiques of the idea of term limits, but I will never give any weight to the argument that essential institutional experience would be left to unelected bureaucrats and lobbyists in the future.

In Federalist No. 65 Hamilton discusses the responsibility of the Senate to try cases of impeachment. Despite, or possibly because of, the cases and threats of impeachment within my own lifetime which have been driven more by political considerations than by rational thought my respect is fixed for the method of impeachment and trials of impeachment designed by our founders and unaltered over two centuries.

Tags change congress, documents, federalist, history, senate

culture General National

Federalist Nos. 62 – 63

Federalist Papers 62 and 63 begin examining the Senate, just as the House has been examined in recent papers. I was quickly surprised to find this gem:

So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic. (emphasis added)

The notion that the larger states might dislike equal representation has become reality among some citizens of larger states.

I also found proof of how different our political system is now than it was in 1888:

The mutability in the public councils arising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some stable institution in the government. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of the representatives. (emphasis added)

I would challenge anyone to show me an example of any of our states that regularly replaces one third of its representatives – let alone one half – either at the state level or in their federal delegation each election cycle. Sadly, our increased stability has not decreased the downside of the instability is was to replace:

It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood{or} if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated . . .

Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the FEW, not for the MANY. (emphasis added)

Federalist 63 suggests:

the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself with repeating, that a senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it into a tyrannical aristocracy.

It is interesting to note that the Senate has come closer to being "a tyrannical aristocracy" since it began to be elected by the people directly than it ever was under the indirect model. Additionally, the change to direct elections of senators leads us to change the following statement:

Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally corrupt the people at large.

That statement would now read:

Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives; and must finally corrupt the people at large.

Sadly we appear to be in the advances stages of the corruption of the people. (Although I admit that the Senate does not appear to be the cause of the corruption, nor was it necessarily propagated in that order.) Nor does the prescribed remedy appear very promising right now:

if such a revolution should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot guard against, the House of Representatives, with the people on their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles.

Federalist 62 also included this statement (which should probably be engraved on the office wall of every national elected official):

It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust.

Tags documents, federalist, history, senate

life National

Federalist Nos. 59 – 61

Federalist Papers 59, 60, and 61 discuss the power of Congress to regulate the elections of members of Congress. This power is meant to be exercised by the individual states while allowing the federal government to make some blanket provisions to ensure some uniformity within the union. Some people worried that Congress might be able to make some rules which would favor some people over others with respect to the ability to be elected as a member of Congress. I found it very interesting that Hamilton stated:

the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government. The House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people

Since then we have changed so that Senators are elected immediately by the people and there are growing numbers of people calling for a direct election for the president. As I have always argued on that topic, the establishment of an electoral college was made for reasons very different from an inability to counts the votes of all the people of the nation.

This subject also serves as an additional evidence of the value of having the states serve as laboratories of government. Often the various Federalist Papers discuss the virtues of the Constitution by comparing it favorably to the various state constitutions.

One final observation by Hamilton led me to an interesting if totally impractical idea:

I am inclined to think that treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total dissolution of the body at the same time, might be less formidable to liberty than one third of that duration subject to gradual and successive alterations.

Rather than advocating term limits of the form that no member may serve in office more than 12 years perhaps we would be better served to say that every 8 or 12 years all sitting members of the house may not stand for re-election – that would impede if not destroy the infusion of any improper spirit that may prevail in congress "into the new members, as they come forward in succession."

Tags change congress, documents, federalist, history

National

Federalist No. 58

I was tempted to not closely read Federalist No. 58 because I already knew that the assumptions it contained, however accurate they may have been in the 18th century had been rendered obsolete int he 20th century. For the first 120 years of our history the size of the House was expanded as the population grew. In fact, it was expanded 10 times in those 120 years with each expansion averaging over 30 new seats.

Had that trend continued we would have a house of over 700 members today. Instead 98 years ago, in 1911, the size of the house was expanded for the last time to 435. Aside from a temporary expansion when Hawaii and Alaska became states and the potential of adding two new seats in order to give a voting seat to Washington D.C. our population has more than tripled in the last century while our House size has stagnated. It’s time for use to force Congress to do what the founders intended by augmenting the size of the House as our population increases. We should require that Congress not ignore this action in the future by adding a Constitutional amendment stipulating a maximum number of people to be represented in a congressional district. (The Founders were wise enough to stipulate a minimum in the Constitution.)

Thankfully I did choose to read the whole of Federalist 58 and I found this one caution to the idea of unchecked expansion of the size of the house:

Experience will forever admonish them that, on the contrary, AFTER SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF SAFETY, OF LOCAL INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE WHOLE SOCIETY, they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed.

This should not stop us from returning to the practice of expanding the size of the House in proportion to the growth of the population, but we only need look to the way that public opinion is so fickle in raging against a $165 Million bonus while standing silent in response to bailouts one thousand times as large and spending proposals (which are each another 5 times larger than the bailouts) to recognize that the caution remains true. While we are expanding the House we should not get so carried away that we dilute the power of individual representatives within the House. At least we have the Senate in place with it’s smaller size to help mitigate the potential weaknesses of a House too large. It’s time to once again have one legislative body where the representatives are connected to their constituents rather than being concceted to their chamber.

Tags change congress, documents, federalist, history

National

Federalist No. 57

Federalist No. 57 contains a statement describing the proper goals of any constitution boiled down to two simple points:

The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.

In defending the provisions in the proposed Constitution the following defense was sound in theory but two centuries of growing experience has led to a Congress that is masterful at the art of public obfuscation:

the House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed,

The members of the House are always aware of their impending re-election bids so they carefully craft the perception of what they are doing by hiding legislation and casting votes in a way that makes them look good back home even when they are working for the opposite results on some issues when the cameras are not around.

Next I find our present society perfectly captured:

what is to restrain the House of Representatives . . . above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America, a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in return is nourished by it. If this spirit shall ever be so far debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate any thing but liberty.

(emphasis added)

The numbers in the latter part of this paper regarding the number of people electing a member of congress are almost comical today. In 1788 we might have trusted that two members of congress would feel connected and answerable to 60 Thousand constituents but there is little doubt today that one member of congress may easily feel little connection with 600 Thousand constituents (a small district).

Tags change congress, documents, federalist, history, house

National

Federalist Nos. 55 – 56

Federalist No. 55 and Federalist No. 56 explore a subject which has grown increasingly interesting and important to me the more I have studied – that is a consideration of the proper size of the House of Representatives. Here I find, unsurprisingly, that a few assumptions were made which have proven to be critically incorrect.

It will not be thought an extravagant conjecture that the first census will, at the rate of one for every thirty thousand, raise the number of representatives to at least one hundred. . . At the expiration of twenty-five years, according to the computed rate of increase, the number of representatives will amount to two hundred, and of fifty years, to four hundred. This is a number which, I presume, will put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the body.

I found it ironic that the projections ended at 400 representatives because we now have 435 voting representatives and we can see that with our current population (exceeding 300 Million) that number is decidedly insufficient – not simply because 435 is not enough, but because 435 is not enough for the expanded (and expanding) role that government has come to take in our nation. The problems that have arisen through a House that is too small to be properly representative could have been prevented by including not only a minimum number which a representative could represent (thirty thousand) but also a maximum number they could represent. The range could even be fairly large (say a maximum of one quarter million active voters per representative – which is over eight times the minimum) to produce a body which could never become fully detached from the people they are meant to represent.

The first wrong assumption was that the ratio would bear some resemblance to the minimum of thirty thousand that had been specified. The second was that we could never have cause for concern with a representative body exceeding four hundred members.

Another wrong assumption is shown in this statement from Federalist No. 56:

It is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the representative relate.

The assumption was that the interests and authority of the representative body in question would remain limited according to the Constitution. Not only does this show a poor assumption but it exposes another avenue for alleviating the problems of our too-small representative body. A reduction in the scope of authority for Congress would also serve to make it possible for a body of 435 to be more faithfully representative of the populous.

A fourth false assumption was:

I am unable to conceive that the people of America, in their present temper, or under any circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every second year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a hundred men who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery.

Indeed we live in a time when the people of America choose and repeat the choice of over 400 representatives who consistently pursue some treacherous policies. Whatever changes we do see in the faces of the House it should be noted that attrition takes many more from their seats than being unseated by the vote of the people.

In fairness, our founders were aware of their limitations:

What change of circumstances, time, and a fuller population of our country may produce, requires a prophetic spirit to declare, which makes no part of my pretensions.

They also thought they had addressed the pitfalls before them by allowing for an increase in the number of representatives:

The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken care that the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the government.

What they missed was that we need to require increases at some point. Whatever their failings of foresight, their conclusion remains true:

a representative for every THIRTY THOUSAND INHABITANTS will render the {inhabitants} both a safe and competent guardian of the interests which will be confided to it.

Today we are in great need to pursue some combination of increasing the size of our representative body or decreasing the scope of authority for that body. There are indications that increasing the size may naturally result in pressures to decrease the authority that rests in the federal government – I would hope that to be the case.

Tags documents, federalist, government, history, house

General

Federalist No. 54

Federalist No. 54 is not particularly applicable to any of our current political issues, but it is very instructive of the process of political compromise. I also found it to be a very interesting example of the logical somersaults that a person can be brought to accept when they believe in the morality of something as immoral as slavery. The statement below captured a great logical pretzel.

we must deny the fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others, the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property.

Tags documents, federalist, history

General

Federalist Nos. 52 – 53

Federalist No. 52 and Federalist No. 53 begin an exploration of the individual branches of government as defined in the Constitution by considering the purpose, composition, and structure of the House of Representatives. While they were trying to rectify the weaknesses of existing legislative bodies, sometimes it can feel like we still live under a system where:

The only dependence of the representatives on the people consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies by the election of new members

The final paragraph of Federalist 52 contained this sentence:

It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no other circumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration; and, conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely may its duration be protracted.

This got me thinking because that would suggest that the Senate has the less power than the House of Representatives. I had always believed that the Senate had comparatively more power than the House. I’d be curious to know what others think about their relative power.

Federalist 53 makes passing reference to:

a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the government and alterable by the government.

I stopped for a minute to think about that. With the way our Constitution today is almost invisible within the laws passed by Congress I almost believed that our government was busy changing the Constitution. I soon realized that I was wrong. They may ignore the Constitution, but they cannot change it. In order to change the Constitution both houses of Congress must pass a bill for the change by supermajorities, but even if they were unanimous the change cannot go into effect until majorities in three quarters of the states also ratify the amending bill. It’s no wonder they ignore the Constitution so much, they can’t change their minds about it with every administration if they were to try making a change to our legal foundation. And yet our Congress acts very much like the British Parliament that they were designed to improve upon:

Even in Great Britain, where the principles of political and civil liberty have been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, as well with regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the most fundamental articles of the government.

I particularly liked the description of the challenging task that representatives in the federal government would have to undertake. Even before we allowed the federal government to reach into every aspect of our daily lives the citizens were supposed to select someone who could tackle this:

The laws are so far from being uniform, that they vary in every State; whilst the public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very extensive region, and are extremely diversified . . . A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal representative, and which has not been mentioned is that of foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws of other nations.

Finally there is another instance of the federalist authors making an assumption that turns out to be less than accurate:

A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages.

Sadly, it is not a few who become members of long standing by frequent reelections. Instead it has become almost universal, and they almost universally avail themselves of the advantages of their office.

Tags documents, federalist, history, political figures, questions