Tag: federalist

Federalist No. 50

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Federalist No. 50 brings forth the distinction between occasional appeals to the people and periodical appeals to the people. While I am not sure that this paper really satisfies the question it does force consideration of the question of what the difference is and how it plays out. The founders clearly settled on periodical appeals as proven by pre-set term lengths for various offices. They chose not to provide a limit to individual service, but they set the length of terms for the Representatives, Senators and the President. These set term length guarantee that we will go to the polls as a nation every two years, whether we like the way our government is functioning or not, and cast our votes to determine our representation for the next 2, 4 or 6 years (depending on the office in question).

If we want to consider the effect of occasional appeals we can look to other governments around the world such as Israel.

Another issue that was illustrated in this Federalist Paper is the effect parties can have of manipulating the thinking of otherwise intelligent people.

When men exercise their reason coolly and freely on a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different opinions on some of them.

It has always disturbed me to see those Republicans who will always praise the actions of Republican leaders and always denounce the actions of Democratic leaders. Likewise I am unimpressed by those Democrats who always praise Democrats and always oppose the actions of any Republican.

Of course the different parties have legitimate differences of opinion and the people who join the parties do so for a reason, but to refuse to see any good across the aisle is a recipe for poor policy. Real leaders know how to recognize the value being offered by the opposition and will not oppose the other party simply on the principle that it is the other party.

Tags documents, federalist, history, parties

General

Federalist No. 49

Federalist No. 49 really surprised me. The topic is keeping the proper balance of powers in check through the use of constitutional conventions when the balance of powers were out of bounds. I expected a favorable opinion from the paper. In theory I agree except that I keep thinking that the same people who were part of the problem were also the most likely to be sent to the convention to correct the problem. Just look at 90% of incumbents winning reelection at the same time as Congress has a 9% approval rating.

Interestingly the paper cites this very reason as cause to be wary of placing too much trust in such a mechanism to correct encroachments in the balance of power. That leaves me wondering – how do we fix our current impalance of power?

Tags documents, federalist, history

National

Federalist Nos. 47 – 48

I had never really considered the interplay between the concept of separation of powers and the concept of checks and balances between branches of government. Here Madison explores the limits on the separation of powers (Federalist No. 47) and the necessity of robust checks and balances (Federalist No. 48). Having read these papers I have a greater respect for the delicate balance that the founders were attempting to strike.

Madison also provides some input into the perspective of the people of his time as he discusses their propensity to fear the power of the Executive branch over the power of the Legislative branch. He argues that the unchecked legislature was as dangerous (and more likely in the government of the United States) as an absolute monarch:

In a government where numerous and extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary monarch, the executive department is very justly regarded as the source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal for liberty ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude of people exercise in person the legislative functions, and are continually exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation and concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their executive magistrates, tyranny may well be apprehended, on some favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter. But in a representative republic, where the executive magistracy is carefully limited; both in the extent and the duration of its power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.

Given our current experience it might be very easy for us to think that he was wrong and that the people were right to have more fear of their executive branch than of their legislative branch. We would do well to remember that the recent and pervasive abuses of the executive branch, and the expansion of power within that branch were facilitated by a Congress that was complicit at worst and neglectful of their own duties at best. While it is certainly time to curtail the authority of the executive branch we should be mindful that these abuses were less a failing of the Constitution than they were a failure on the part of our other elected representatives. In fact, Madison discuses a similar situation in the government of Pennsylvania:

It appears, also, that the executive department had not been innocent of frequent breaches of the constitution. There are three observations, however, which ought to be made on this head: FIRST, a great proportion of the instances were either immediately produced by the necessities of the war, or recommended by Congress or the commander-in-chief; SECONDLY, in most of the other instances, they conformed either to the declared or the known sentiments of the legislative department; THIRDLY, the executive department of Pennsylvania is distinguished from that of the other States by the number of members composing it. In this respect, it has as much affinity to a legislative assembly as to an executive council. And being at once exempt from the restraint of an individual responsibility for the acts of the body, and deriving confidence from mutual example and joint influence, unauthorized measures would, of course, be more freely hazarded, than where the executive department is administered by a single hand

The executive branch of Pennsylvania at that time was composed of a thirteen-member Supreme Executive Council.

It’s time for our Congress to stand up and do their job of checking the executive branch. Once they do that they should follow it up by mandating that the president reduce the footprint of the federal government by shrinking or eliminating government agencies or departments that are not essential to providing the services that are appropriate to the federal government.

Tags checks and balances, documents, federalist, history, Pennsylvania, separation of powers, State Constitution

culture

Federalist No. 46

The subject and position of Federalist No. 46 is not substantially different from Federalist No. 45 and my reaction is largely the same as before. On the other hand, Madison makes an important point that expands the scope of my reaction.

Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States. . . The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes.

My initial reaction was that, like the states, the people in general are no longer guarding their liberty so much as their financial security. Some further consideration convinced me that Madison was right and that my reaction was actually an indication of the fundamental problem.

The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed {the federal and state governments}, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone

Although it is easy to feel that the government has gone out of control we must remember that we still have relatively free, fair, and regular elections. The fundamental problem which allows the government to exced their constitutional bounds is not that there are no reins, but that we the people have let go of the reins (this is especially true in places like Utah where the participation in even the most basic civic functions like voting is abysmal). The result is that our runaway horse of government is sometimes staffed by officials elected to virtually hereditary positions and while we may yell about the dangers of the course being taken by our uncontrolled stagecoach, the actual solution is for us to undertake the challenging task of grasping the reins once more and asserting our control over the horse of government. Only after we have tried our hands at the reins can the horse truly be said to be a runaway – prior to a serious attempt at control it is our own failure and not the fault of the horse.

One final quote that I really appreciated:

Measures will too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices, interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual States. What is the spirit that has in general characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians of a common interest;

Interestingly, the final protection against a federal takeover of the lives of the citizens (as cited by Madison) is the right of the people to keep and bear arms. An alarmist would be quick to take every attempt to regulate the keeping of arms by private individuals as a fundamental threat to individual liberty – and their alarm would not be without legitimate foundation.

Tags civic participation, documents, federalist, government, history

National State

Federalist No. 45

I wish we had a constitutionally limited federal government such as the one that Madison is promoting/defending in Federalist No. 45.

the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of {the powers transferred to the federal government} will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States.

Madison argues that there is little danger from the federal government to the authority of the states. Perhaps we can forgive him as his frame of reference was that:

history does not inform us that either {the Achaean league or the Lycian Confederacy} ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consolidated government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities.

With the advantage of hindsight we can see where we diverged in practice from the foundations laid for oureffective but limited government.

The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures. Even the House of Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the State legislatures.

Today it would be much more accurate to say that state governments may be regarded as constituent, but in no way essential, parts of the federal government while the federal government is absolutely essential to the operation and organization of the state governments (financial dependence will do that to you every time). State governments now play a token role (if any role at all) in the election of the President, the senate is no longer elected in any way by the state legislature, and the fact that the members of the house of representatives is drawn from the ranks of those who would also be chosen into the state legislatures is no form of protection for our liberties.

The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller than the number employed under the particular States. There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers, for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description who will be employed in the administration of the federal system.

The number of people employed by the federal government and its many agencies is enormous and while it may not have been true in the 1880’s, today more people can name their representative and senators at the federal level than can do so for their state representatives (admittedly, many people can not name any of their representatives). This discrepancy illustrates that the influence of the federal officers exceeds the influence of the local officers even at the local level (despite the fact that the local officers have more direct impact on the lives of citizens).

The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.

While the powers granted to the state governments are still indefinite today, the definer of those powers in practice has been the Federal government. And while the powers delegated tot he federal government are defined, the federal government has felt no obligation to limit their exercise of authority to those defined powers. Also, as the federal government has exercised increased authority, they have generally done so over "internal objects" which concern the lives, liberties etc. of the citizens in their ordinary course of affairs – directly infringing upon those areas of authority which were to be within the purview of the state government.

It should be noted that most of these changes in our society and political structure are a direct result of ill-advised changes in the Constitution. Those which are not a result of changes in the Constitution are a result of the Constitution being trampled and ignored.

Tags documents, federalist, history, unconstitutional

National State

Federalist No. 44

Although it is not the central point of Federalist No. 44, I found it very interesting to read the fervent distrust of paper money that the defenders of the Constitution had based on their experience – especially considering our present circumstances of economic uncertainty that are largely due to the instability of paper currency (which we manipulate, and experience steady inflation and erratic deflation).

I also found another example of an assumption of our founders which has since been rendered false – this one relates to the checks and balances to be found between state and federal authority.

as every such act of the {federal government} (to violate their Constitutional authority) will be an invasion of the rights of the {state governments}, these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to sound the alarm to the people, and to exert their local influence in effecting a change of federal representatives. There being no such intermediate body between the State legislatures and the people interested in watching the conduct of the former, violations of the State constitutions are more likely to remain unnoticed and unredressed.

If our states today were truly guarding their constitutional autrity with the jealousy that the founders envisioned I doubt that we the federal behemoth that we are carrying around today which, due to its sheer size, has convinced a large portion of our society that it is capable of solving all our perceived woes. The unfortunate truth is that our states today hardly even whimper at any violation of Constitutional authority by the federal government. There are rare exceptions – such as the backlash against the Real ID Act – but those cases are often nothing more than a plea for full funding when they are asked to implement a federal program that exceeds the Constitutional authority of the government. The states no longer guard their authority – they simply guard their balance sheets.

At the same time, the statement that there are no intermediaries watching the state governments and calling the people to action reamins as true as it was presented in 1788. One might expect that job to be handled by an independent and free press, but the press has done no better at that task than the state governments have done on their level.

Tags documents, federalist, history, media, money, unconstitutional

General

Federalist Nos. 41 – 43

These papers by Madison cover topics that had previously been addressed by Hamilton in Federalist Nos. 24 – 28, and 30 – 36 (covered here, here, and here).

Federalist No. 41 focuses primarily on the issue of standing armies, Federalist No. 42 concerns issues of foreign relations, law enforcement, and interstate commerce, and Federalist No. 43 addresses further specifics of law enforcement, interstate commerce and other miscellaneous powers specified in the Constitution.

I love this description of the Articles of Confederation from Federalist No. 42:

the articles of Confederation have inconsiderately endeavored to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole remain.

Federalist No. 43 contains a statement that describes a principle weakness of the United Nations:

Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature.

I do not consider the words of Madison either inferior or superior to Hamilton on these subjects. I do believe that some people would be more swayed by one approach while other people would connect more with the approach of the other.

Tags Articles of Confederation, documents, federalist, history

General

Federalist No. 40

It is only very recently that I heard someone express the sentiment that the Constitutional Convention of 1787 exceeded their authority in the Constitution they proposed. I was therefore more interested in reading Federalist No. 40 which addresses this exact question. The conclusion is a resounding dismissal of the charge save in one particular:

In one particular it is admitted that the convention have departed from the tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES, they have reported a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE, and may be carried into effect by NINE STATES ONLY. It is worthy of remark that this objection, though the most plausible, has been the least urged in the publications which have swarmed against the convention. The forbearance can only have proceeded from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a thirteenth; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a MAJORITY of one sixtieth of the people of America to a measure approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising fifty-nine sixtieths of the people an example still fresh in the memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection, therefore, has been in a manner waived by those who have criticised the powers of the convention, I dismiss it without further observation.

The charge was repeated in the context of lamenting what might happen if a new Constitutional Convention were convened in our day. If that is ever to happen, I only hope that those chosen to attend the convention can use their mandate with as much wisdom to produce a Constitution that is as well-suited to good government as the one we have today.

Personally I think the best single change would be for us to adhere to the Constitution we have.

Tags Constitution, documents, federalist, history

culture National

Federalist No. 39

Federalist No. 39 seems to contain the central argument that is being addressed in the debate over ratifying the constitution:

"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States." And it is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was undertaken?

It seems that it was commonly assumed that the only proper form of government was a republican form. If we had a new constitutional convention today I would not be surprised if many people felt that the proper form of government would rightly be a democratic form. I believe that the reason for this lies in the distinction between a federal government and a national government:

The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. (a national government) Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. (a federal government) In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. (my notes added)

As our government has taken on a more national character (as the local levels of government have become more subordinated to the federal government) it is natural for people to want a more direct say in the actions of that general government and thus the assumption of the desireability of a democratic form of government. I worry about this mindset.

The conclusion is that the government formed by the Constitution is a balance of federal and national in form. The proper solution to our national political ills is not to advance further down the misguided path that the founders were studiously avoiding (a democratic form and a national form) but to return to the solution that they so wisely pursued (the republican form balanced between national and federal in character). We need to teach the body politic the virtues of the republican form of government and the virtues of a balance between federalism and nationalism so that they will demand that their government, which is structured for just that balance, will act as it was designed to act so that their liberty is preserved as it was intended to be.

Tags Constitution, documents, federalism, federalist, history, liberty

General

Federalist No. 38

It was very interesting to read in Federalist No. 38 that one primary difference between this Constitution and the constitutions of Greece and Athens (among other examples) is that this one was developed by a group instead of being drawn up by a single respected individual.

The bulk of this Federalist paper goes to show how lively and varied the debate was which surrounded the ratification of the Constitution. Warning – this is undoubtedly the longest paragraph in the federalist papers so far with a total length of 1100 words. It is worth the time to read it, but without paragraph breaks it is easy to lose you place in such a long passage. With the advantage of being able to look back it is interesting to see which changes that were being considered were added to the Constitution (e.g. the Bill of Rights) and which were left unchanged (e.g. the 20 year moratorium on discussion the issue of slave importation) by the end of the debate.

Tags Bill of Rights, Constitution, documents, federalist, government, history